Qatar-Iran Economic Relations Will Improve, Contrary to Saudi Arabia’s Intent

Saudi Arabia’s attempt to isolate Qatar will backfire and lead to Qatar improving economic relations with Iran.

On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), cut diplomatic ties with Qatar,[1] and Egypt and Yemen soon did the same. The Saudi coalition’s ostensible reason for these diplomatic cuts was that Qatar supports terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and Iranian-back political groups.[2] Although Qatar’s support for certain organizations such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood does invoke hostility throughout the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is not fully disclosing their reasoning for cutting ties. The reality is that Saudi Arabia desires for Qatar to be a satellite state, as it was until the mid-1990s. Since then, Qatar has developed policies independent of Saudi Arabia.[3]

Unfortunately for the Saudi coalition, Qatar will not meet their current demands. This attempt to isolate Qatar will backfire and lead to Qatar improving economic relations with other regional states and especially Iran.

Historical Context of Saudi-Qatari Relations

The deep tension between the Saudi coalition and Qatar is a deviation from the status quo that has existed over the last 15 years. In fact, these countries have aligned on a number of foreign policy issues since the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the early 1980s, whose membership includes Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman.

For example, during Bahrain’s Arab Spring in 2011 (Pearl Revolution), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar all supported the Bahraini Sunni regime against the Shia-backed protests, and these countries sent military troops and equipment to extinguish the protests.[4]

Likewise, during the current Syrian Civil War, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have fervently supported the Syrian rebels against the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, including having supplied arms to rebel groups such as Jaish al-Fatah and the Free Syrian Army.[5]

Another illustration is the 2015 Yemen Civil War, in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have sent equipment and troops to fight against the Shia Houthi rebels.[6]

Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s Relationship Deteriorates

Although much cooperation has occurred between Qatar and the Saudi coalition, there has been an increasing bitterness between Qatar and Saudi Arabia over the past 20 years. Saudi Arabia’s current intentions are related to Qatar’s transformation from a puppet state to an independent state in the mid-1990s.

From 1972-1995, Qatar’s Emir Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani followed Saudi Arabia’s policies. This former Emir did not develop relations with Iran, Iraq (after its invasion of Kuwait), or Israel.[7]

In 1995, however, Emir Hamd al-Thani was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his son Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani,[8] who sought to rebuild the Qatari-Iraqi relationship, share an oil field with Iran, and develop a gas trade deal with Israel.[9] Furthermore, the new emir intended to promote Qatar’s democratic policies, women’s rights, and an open media.[10]

Saudi Arabia recognized Qatar’s independent ambitions and intended to quell them. So, in 1996, Saudi Arabia covertly led a failed counter-coup in Qatar to return the former emir,[11] who was then living in exile in the UAE. Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani heard word of this attempted coup and stopped it with alacrity.[12]

Qatar’s Independence Enrages Saudi Arabia

Within a few years of his reign, Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani took Qatar from a satellite state to a regional economic powerhouse. For example, in 1990, Qatar’s GDP was below $10 billion, while by 2007 it had reached an outstanding $100 billion (and by 2014 $200 billion).[13] The main reason for Qatar’s GPD increase was its abundance of natural gas.[14] Likewise, the money from the natural gas industry fund also assisted in funding Qatar’s state-owned broadcaster, the Al Jazeera Media Network, which was established in 1996.

Al Jazeera became known as the outlet for independent voices throughout the Middle East,[15] and frequently Al Jazeera was critical of leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan (while being quiet about the Qatari regime).[16]

Al Jazeera also allowed airtime to perspectives from Islamist groups in Egypt and Palestine, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. It has provided and encouraged alternative opinions to Saudi Arabia’s state-owned media networks. As a result, Saudi Arabia was irritated by Al Jazeera’s persistent criticism and encouragement of opposing views.

Because Al Jazeera is unlike other Gulf media outlets and vocally criticizes Gulf regimes, Saudi Arabia has desired to shut it down.[17] Saudi Arabia fears that critical coverage of its leaders would fuel domestic unrest, but Qatar refuses to close down Al Jazeera.

Also, during the 1990s, Qatar was trying to develop a strong relationship with the United States, similar to the Saudi Arabia-U.S. relationship. At this time, the US established the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and one ostensible goal of the American troops was to protect Saudi oil from Saddam Hussein’s troops. As the Gulf War intensified, the American troop numbers increased, and these troops overstayed their welcome.[18] The unwelcomed American presence at the U.S. Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia began producing unrest from Saudi citizens. The decade-long presence of American troops incited Islamic extremism in Saudi Arabia because it is home to Islam’s two most holy sites: Mecca and Medina.[19] To avoid provoking increasing unrest in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. finally left this airbase and was invited by Qatar to create a military base at Qatar’s expense. In 1996, the United States al-Udeid Air Base was built in Qatar.

As can be noted from above, Saudi Arabia’s current motives to pursue diplomatic cuts stem from Qatar’s motivation to be independent, which weakens Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. As a result, Saudi Arabia has also pulled its coalition states (UAE, Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen) on board, who dislike Qatar for various reasons.

For example, in Egypt, former President Hosni Mubarak and the current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi were harshly criticized by the Qatari owned news agency Al-Jazeera.[20] Likewise, in political contests Qatar favored former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi during his presidential run,[21] but once President Morsi won the presidency he was overthrown in a coup, with the military acting under current President el-Sisi. Bahrain is well known to be a satellite state of the Saudi government, as could be seen from 2011 when Saudi Arabia sent troops into Bahrain to squelch Shia protests.[22] The United Arab Emirates, like Saudi Arabia, sees Qatar’s vocalized support for the Muslim Brotherhood as hostile to its own regime.[23] As for Yemen, the current internationally recognized government claimed that Qatar has close dealings with Iran and Yemeni Houthi rebels.[24] These rebels are fighting the current Yemeni government.

The Turkish-Qatari and Iranian-Qatari Relationships

While animosity towards Qatar has been building from the other embargo states, Qatar has not been sitting idle. It has been building its relationship with Turkey as well as Iran, Saudi Arabia’s nemesis. The Turkish-Qatari relationship has been developing quickly over the past five years. In 2015, Turkey and Qatar formed the High-Level Cooperation Council,[25] which was created because Qatar and Turkey shared a number of similar foreign policy interests:

  • Both Turkey and Qatar supported Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and opposed the coup in Egypt.
  • Both nations support the Syrian rebels in Syria against the al-Assad regime.
  • Both nations support the Islamist groups opposed to the internationally recognized government in Libya, while the United Arab Emirates and Egypt support the officially recognized government.[26]
  • In 2015, Turkey opened its first airbase in the Arabian Gulf (also known as the Persian Gulf), in Qatar. [27]

The Turkish-Qatari relationship has seemed to threaten Saudi Arabia’s influence by bringing another major power into the region.

Likewise, Qatar’s relationship with Iran has also immensely developed. On May 22, 2017, Qatari leader al-Thani called Iranian President Rouhani to congratulate him on his election victory (which was insulting to other Saudi coalition states).[28] Additionally, Iran and Qatar’s close relationship is primarily economically based. Underneath the Arabian Gulf, both countries share the largest gas reserve field in the world.

Since 2005, Qatar has developed this gas reserve, known as North Dome (on the Qatar side), and Iran has worked to develop South Pars (on the Iran side), but it has not been as fortunate as Qatar in its gas developments.[29] For this reason, in 2013 Qatar publically stated that they would collaborate with Iran to develop South Par, which would increase production and profits for both countries. This cooperation further upset Saudi Arabia.[30]

The success of economic relations has led to Qatar and Iran opening embassies and meetings of high-level officials. It seems that the relationship will keep improving since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani publicly endorsed strengthening relations with Qatar. He stated on June 25, 2017, “Iranian policy is to develop more and more its relations with Doha [Qatar].”[31] Likewise, in August 2017, ignoring the demands of the Saudi coalition states, Qatar restored full diplomatic ties with Iran,[32] after having pulled its ambassador from Tehran in early 2016 to protest attacks on two Saudi diplomatic posts in Tehran (which attacks were prompted by Saudi Arabia’s execution of a prominent Shiite cleric). Qatar said the restoration of ties “expressed its aspiration to strengthen bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in all fields.”[33]

With these new alliances developing, it is no surprise that once the Saudi coalition cut diplomatic relations with Qatar, Iran and Turkey sent food to replace the Saudi coalition’s former imports. By June 11, Iran had sent five cargo planes carrying a combined total of 90 tons of fruits and vegetables to Qatar, and “three ships carrying 350 tons [were] also set to leave Iran”, according to CNN.[34]

Qatar’s Economic Opportunities

Since the beginning of the 2017 Qatar Diplomatic Crisis, Qatar has had a large slump in its imported goods because the majority these products originate from the Saudi coalition states, whereas Qatar’s exports have not had a significant decline. Fortunately for Qatar, the cuts by the Saudi coalition did not affect their gas and oil industry, which is the base of their economy.

Between 2010 and 2015, Qatar imported an average of $26 billion worth of products per year and exported an average of $106 billion worth of products per year.[35] Of these exports, the majority were petroleum gas (55%), crude petrol (22%), and refined petrol (9%), which in aggregate is nearly 90% of their exports.[36]

With respect to Qatari imports, the trade cuts have taken their toll on the economy. Since May 2017, imports have been deeply affected such that in May imports fell by 38% and in June by 40%, according to the Financial Times.[37]

Because Qatar does not receive imports from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen anymore, six essential product categories have been less common: metals, mineral products, animal products, vegetable products, chemical products, and machine products.

Nevertheless, Qatar has the ability to increase its imports with other regional states, especially Iran. If Qatar increases trade with Iran, Turkey, Oman, and China, it can replace the embargo states’ former exports to Qatar. So what products has Qatar lost from the Saudi coalition, and where can it otherwise import those products from?

Metals

Of metal products, Qatar has lost an average of $214 million worth from Saudi Arabia,[38] including $41 million from Cast Iron Pipes and Iron Structures.[39] Additionally, before the crisis, the United Arab Emirates was supplying Qatar with $510[40] million worth, including $108 million from Cooper Wire, $52 million from Hot-Rolled Iron, and $90 million of Iron Structures. Lastly, Qatar has lost $141 million in metals from Bahrain and Egypt.[41]

In metals alone this is over $750 billion and two countries have the capability of replacing these lost products: Iran and Turkey. As of 2015,[42] Iran exported $1.43 billon worth of metals. Most of Iran’s metal products being sold consist of iron products and 20% of the sold metal products are cooper. Additionally, as of 2015, Turkey was one of the top five exporters of Iron Structures and 6th largest seller of Cooper Wire in Asia.[43]

Mineral Products

Of mineral products, Qatar has lost $390 million worth of product from the United Arab Emirates;[44] of this $390 million, this includes $62 million of Refined Petroleum and $298 million of Gravel and Crushed Stone. Also, before the crisis, Bahrain supplied Qatar with $91 million worth of Petrol Coke, Iron Ore, and Pitch Coke.[45]

Of Mineral Products this is nearly $500 million worth of products that Qatar is missing, yet Iran and Oman can alleviate this burden. Iran exports Petrol Coke, Iron Ore, Pitch Coke, and Refined Petroleum,[46] while Oman is one of the top five sellers of Gravel and Crushed Stone in Asia.[47]

Animal Products

Of animal products, Qatar has lost $299 million from Saudi Arabia.[48] This $299 million includes $79 million of Fermented Milk and $78 million of Other Animals (pets, insects, and zoo animals).

However, Turkey and Oman can easily replace these products. As of 2015, Turkey was one of the top five sellers of Fermented Milk to Asia,[49] while Oman was the number one exporter of Other Animals in Asia.[50]

Vegetable Products

Qatar has lost $30 million in Fruits and Vegetables from Saudi Arabia, $65 million worth of Fruits and Vegetables from the United Arab Emirates,[51] and $17 million of Fruits and Vegetables from Egypt.[52]

Yet, as of 2015, Iran exported around $600 million worth of Fruits and Vegetables and year, so they have an opportunity to substitute for Qatar’s lost vegetable products.[53]

Chemical Products and Machine Products

Qatar has lost $192 million worth of chemical products from Saudi Arabia;[54] this amount consists of $41 million of Cleaning Products. Nonetheless, Turkey has the opportunity to replace Qatar’s loses because it is one of the top five sellers of Cleaning Products in Asia as of 2015 data.[55]

As for machine products, Qatar has lost $163 million from Saudi Arabia and $315 million from the United Arab Emirates.[56] This $163 million and $317 million consists of Insulated Wire. Fortunate for Qatar, China (a strong trade partner of Qatar) is the number one seller of Insulated Wire in the world as of 2015.[57]

Over the last five years, Qatar has imported an average of $69 million worth of goods from Iran.[58] The 2017 Diplomatic Crisis creates opportunity for Iran and other regional states to replace the Saudi coalition states as Qatar’s supplier. Likewise, other states such as Turkey, Oman, and China can benefit from this predicament by building a stronger economic relationship with Qatar.

Conclusion

It seems that, contrary to the Saudi regime’s intent to force Qatar to behave as a satellite state, Qatar is turning toward Iran and new trade partners, which will solidify Qatar as a regional power in its own right.

References

[1] Barakat, Sultan. “A Gulf crisis: How did we get here?” Al Jazeera. June 11, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/gulf-crisis-170611063706500.html.

[2] Wintour, Patrick. “Gulf plunged into diplomatic crisis as countries cut ties with Qatar.” The Guardian. June 05, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism.

[3] Weinberg, David Andrew. “Qatar vs. Saudi Arabia: How Iran and the Brotherhood Tore the Gulf Apart.” The National Interest. June 8, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/qatar-vs-saudi-arabia-how-iran-the-brotherhood-tore-the-gulf-21068.

[4] Cornell University Library . “Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide * الربيع العربي: Bahrain.” Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide. June 27, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200754.

[5] Alami, Mona. “Gulf countries take back seat on Syria route.” Al-Monitor. March 14, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2017/03/gulf-saudi-arabia-support-rebels-syria-yemen.html.

[6] Botelho, Greg, and Saeed Ahmed. “Saudis lead air campaign against rebels in Yemen.” CNN. March 26, 2015. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/26/middleeast/yemen-saudi-arabia-airstrikes/index.html

[7] Patrick Cockburn. “Emir of Qatar deposed by his son.” The Independent. June 27, 1995. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html.

[8] Patrick Cockburn. “Emir of Qatar deposed by his son.” The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html

[9] Patrick Cockburn. “Emir of Qatar deposed by his son.” The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html

[10] Lambert, Jennifer. “Political Reform in Qatar: Participation, Legitimacy and Security.” Middle East Policy Council. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://mepc.org/political-reform-qatar-participation-legitimacy-and-security.

[11] The Irish Times. “Qatar accuses sheikh of ordering countering coup.” The Irish Times. February 21, 1996. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/qatar-accuses-sheikh-of-ordering-countering-coup-1.31303.

[12] Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Qatar: The Gulf’s Problem Child.” The Atlantic. June 05, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/qatar-gcc-saudi-arabia-yemen-bahrain/529227/.

[13] “Qatar GDP  1970-2017 .” Trading Economics. 2016. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://tradingeconomics.com/qatar/gdp.

[14] Soghom, Mardo. “The Economic Incentive Behind Qatar’s Iran Ties.” Radio Farda. June 06, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-qatar–relations-economic-gas-fields-south-pars/28529537.html.

[15] Rahim, Taufiq. “Another Coup for the Outgoing Emir of Qatar.” The Huffington Post. June 27, 2013. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/another-coup-for-the-outg_b_3497895.html.

[16] Erickson, Amanda. “Analysis | Why Saudi Arabia hates Al Jazeera so much.” The Washington Post. June 23, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/23/why-saudi-arabia-hates-al-jazeera-so-much/?utm_term=.00895bb0f2a8.

[17] The World Staff. “Al Jazeera responds to demands that it be shut down.” Public Radio International. June 26, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-06-26/al-jazeera-responds-demands-it-be-shut-down.

[18] Otterman, Sharon. “SAUDI ARABIA: Withdrawl of U.S. Forces.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 7, 2005. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/saudi-arabia-withdrawl-us-forces.

[19] Otterman, Sharon. “SAUDI ARABIA: Withdrawl of U.S. Forces.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html

[20] Carlstrom, Gregg. “Why Egypt Hates Al Jazeera.” Foreign Policy. February 19, 2014. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/19/why-egypt-hates-al-jazeera/.

[21] Global Security. “Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar.” GlobalSecurity.org . Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/qatar-muslim-brotherhood.htm.

[22] Chick, Kristen. “Saudi troops arrive in Bahrain as protests escalate.” The Christian Science Monitor. March 14, 2011. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0314/Saudi-troops-arrive-in-Bahrain-as-protests-escalate.

[23] Trager, Eric. “The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis.” The Atlantic. July 02, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/muslim-brotherhood-qatar/532380/.

[24] Reuters Staff. “Yemen cuts diplomatic ties with Qatar: state news agency.” Reuters. June 05, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-yemen-idUSKBN18W0RS.

[25] Anadolu Agency. “Turkey, Qatar agree to form cooperation council.” Anadolu Agency. January 20, 2015. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-qatar-agree-to-form-cooperation-council/82341.

[26] Schanzer, Jonathan. “Turkey’s Secret Proxy War in Libya?” The National Interest. March 17, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkeys-secret-proxy-war-libya-12430.

[27] Murdock, Heather. “Turkey Opens First Mideast Military Base in Qatar.” VOA. May 11, 2016. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-opens-first-middle-east-military-base-in-qatar/3323653.html.

[28] “Qatari Emir commends Rouhani on victory in election.” Mehr News Agency. May 22, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/125508/Qatari-Emir-commends-Rouhani-on-victory-in-election.

[29] Soghom, Mardo. “The Economic Incentive Behind Qatar’s Iran Ties.” Radio Farda. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-qatar–relations-economic-gas-fields-south-pars/28529537.html

[30] Haaretz, and Reuters. “The Qatar-Iran gas field behind the diplomatic war in the Middle East.” Haaretz. June 07, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.793798.

[31] AFP. “Rouhani: Iran seeks stronger relationship with Qatar.” The Times of Israel. June 25, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.timesofisrael.com/rouhani-iran-seeks-stronger-ties-with-qatar/.

[32] The Associated Press. “Qatar restores full diplomatic ties with Iran in stark message to Saudi Arabia, Gulf states.” Haaretz. August 24, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.808702?utm_content=%2Fmiddle-east news%2F1.808702&utm_medium=email&utm_source=smartfocus&utm_campaign=newsletter-daily.

[33] Al Jazeera. “More countries back Saudi Arabia in Iran dispute.” Al Jazeera. January 06, 2016. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/nations-saudi-arabia-row-iran-160106125405507.html.

[34] Joyce, Tom. “Iran steps in to supply Qatar.” Euro Fruit. June 12, 2017. Accessed October 12, 2017. http://www.fruitnet.com/eurofruit/article/172469/iran-steps-in-to-supply-qatar.

[35] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Qatar.” Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 10, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/qat/.

[36] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Qatar.” Massachusetts of Technology. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/qat/

[37] Kerr, Simeon. “Qatar’s imports fall 40% as blockade hits home.” Financial Times. June 30, 2017. Accessed August 12, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/048e5762-f9a4-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71.

[38] Qatar’s lost imports from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Yemen are each individually averaged between 2010-2015.

[39] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Saudi Arabia? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/sau/show/2015/

[40] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from the United Arab Emirates? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/are/show/2015/

[41] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Egypt? (2015)”, Massachusetts Institution of Technology, accessed August 18, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/egy/show/2015/

Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Bahrain? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/bhr/show/2015/

[42] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Iran’s Exports (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn/.

[43] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Which Countries Export Iron Structures? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/show/all/7308/2015/.

Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Cooper Wire Trade Exporters (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/7408/.

[44] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from the United Arab Emirates (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/are/show/2015/

[45] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Bahrain? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/bhr/show/2015/

[46] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Iran’s Exports (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn/

[47] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Which Countries Export Gravel and Crushed Stone (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/show/all/2517/2015/

[48] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Saudi Arabia? (2015)”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/sau/show/2015/

[49] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Which Countries Export Fermented Milk Products? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/show/all/0403/2015/

[50] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Other Animals Trade: Exporters (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/0106/

[51] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Saudi Arabia? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/sau/show/2015/

Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from the United Arab Emirates (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/are/show/2015/

[52] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Egypt? (2015)”, Massachusetts Institution of Technology, accessed August 18, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/egy/show/2015/

[53] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Iran’s Exports (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn/

[54] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Saudi Arabia? (2015)”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/sau/show/2015/

[55] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Which Countries Export Cleaning Products? (2015)”, Massachusetts Institution of Technology, accessed August 18, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/show/all/3402/2015/

[56] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Saudi Arabia? (2015)”. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/sau/show/2015/

Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from the United Arab Emirates? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/are/show/2015/

[57] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Which Countries Export Insulated Wire? (2015)”, Massachusetts of Technology, accessed August 15, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/show/all/8544/2015/

[58] Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Qatar import from Iran? (2015)”, Massachusetts Institution of Technology, accessed August 18, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/qat/irn/show/2015/.


One thought on “Qatar-Iran Economic Relations Will Improve, Contrary to Saudi Arabia’s Intent

  1. This is a very insightful article! The economic data along with the historical background used make for a rich analysis that is both in depth and accessible to broader audiences.

    Like

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